In 1995 Hughes Electronics CEO (C. Michael Armstrong) - head of Clinton's export council - urged Secretary of State Warren Christopher that satellites no longer be treated as military goods. On 2/6/96 Clinton approved 4 applications for launches. On the same day, Wang Jun ("Chinese arms dealer") met with Ron Brown and had coffee with Clinton. On 2/15/96 a State Department memo said "the administration wanted to wrap this up." On 3/14/96 Commerce email recommended a low key spin on the news to "not draw attention to the decision." State Department issued regulations shifting most satellite licensing to Commerce on 11/5/96, the day Clinton was re-elected.

Gary Milhollin testimony, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control: "What . I will talk about today, are decisions by our government that have given Chinese companies a green light to sell missile technology to countries like Iran and Pakistan. The Administration has made three crucial decisions in this regard. First, it has decided to transfer control over satellite exports from the State Department to the Commerce Department, an action that effectively pulls the teeth from any future U.S. sanctions against Chinese companies guilty of missile proliferation . Second, it has decided to suspend, without any legal basis, the implementation of U.S. statutes that require sanctions to be imposed against Chinese companies for past sales of missile technology to Iran and Pakistan . Third, it has decided to invite China to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, an invitation that, if accepted, would immunize Chinese firms from any future application of U.S. sanctions laws for missile proliferation . When we look at the cumulative effect of these decisions, we see something both surprising and alarming. Our government has enabled Chinese companies to proliferate missile technology with little fear of punishment. More specifically, Chinese companies have been able to sell Iran and Pakistan components for nuclear capable missiles without worrying about losing U.S. satellite launch contracts. "

DNC documents turned up by Congressional investigators show how Hughes Electronics Corp. successfully persuaded the Clinton administration through two key Democrats (Mankiewicz and Hoog) to ease 1993 Chinese sanctions (for suspected missile parts shipments to Pakistan) so the company's satellites could get to China. The company got congressmen of both parties to send letters to the State Department and ended up with a favorable legal interpretation from Commerce. Said Frank Mankiewicz of the President ``If you employ 30,000 people in California, you've got his eye.''

In a November letter to Clinton, Hughes' executive Armstrong wrote, noting that jobs were at stake: ``You asked me to support your economic package. I did. ... You asked me to support your changes to export policy and controls. I did. You asked me to support NAFTA more strongly in California. I did . I am respectfully requesting your involvement to resolve the China sanctions . Due to circumstances, this will be public and political shortly.'' On December 4, 1993, Armstrong, was invited to attend an event with Clinton in Los Angeles and got to make a personal pitch. At that event, Clinton told Armstrong he was looking into what to do even though he secretly had approved the new interpretation weeks earlier. By early January, Clinton's decision was disclosed and Hughes won a license for one of it satellites shortly after. Two years later, Armstrong was appointed by Clinton to be chairman of his export council.

Twelve year veteran adviser, Peter Leitner in testimony to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on 6/25/98 about the Defense Technology Security Administration, said that under the Clinton administration, the Pentagon office in charge of guarding US technology exports to China grew lax and instructed staffers to soften or reverse their recommendations that certain technology not be exported. He said that when he returned from vacation in 1996, his recommendation against supercomputer exports to Russia had been rewritten to neutral. He also said that the strict attitude of the office changed as the Commerce Department was given primary responsibility for reviewing commercial satellite exports. He said the result was to "deceive both the Congress and the American people ... while shortsighted business interests line their pockets."

American Spectator Kenneth Timmerman 9/98 "On July 13, a Norwegian-built cargo ship, the Sea Launch Commander, steamed into the former U.S. Naval Station at Long Beach, California, carrying Russian and Ukrainian-built missiles. Sound like some cockeyed real-life version of a James Bond movie? Not if you talk to Boeing Space Systems, the U.S. partner in an international joint venture to launch satellites from a floating platform in the South Pacific, using Cold War rocket technology from the former Soviet Union..After several rounds of closed-door meetings at the White House, Gore's staff convinced the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Control to issue the temporary license allowing the ship to dock on July 10--just three days before it actually arrived from Saint Petersburg, where it had been fitted out with more than 600 tons of mission control equipment and a huge covered assembly bay where the rockets would be put together. Government officials said the license has not allayed their fears that Boeing could inadvertently transfer strategic technology to its Russian and Ukrainian partners through the project. One area of concern: NASA's Tracking Data and Relay Satellite System, a network of six military satellites launched by the Space Shuttle in the late 1980's better known by its acronym, TDRSS. Government investigators say that a search carried out on December 12 at the home of [redacted], a Russian-born translator working for Boeing in Seattle, turned up computer disks with codes needed to access the highly classified TDRSS system. [redacted] came to the United States in 1992--well after the failed coup against Yeltsin--and claimed political asylum on grounds that he feared for his life if he returned to Russia. The Immigration and Naturalization Service granted him temporary asylum in 1996. But [redacted]s fears vanished miraculously once he was hired by Boeing as a translator for the Sea Launch project. Since then, he has returned to Russia several times with Boeing officials on contract negotiations and for technical talks. Boeing fired him in October 1997 after they were informed by U.S. officials that as a foreign national he posed a security risk and that allowing him access to munitions-list items was illegal.. Like the Russians, the Chinese have contracted with the Sanam Industries Group, the lead organization for the development of the Shahab-3 missile, the officials said. China Great Wall Industry Corporation, which makes China's space launch rockets as well as the DF-31 ICBM, was the supplier of the telemetry gear. Under existing U.S. legislation, the president is required to cut off U.S. cooperation with foreign entities found to be supplying missile technologies to countries such as Iran. If the president applied the law, that would put an end to U.S. satellite launches in China--and probably in Russia, as well..U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources say Iran is seeking to build a series of solid fuel ICBMs with Chinese and Russian help, that would be capable of reaching targets in the continental United States. So far, the U.S. believes these programs are not very far along; but then, just last year CIA Director George Tenet was saying the U.S. believed the Shahab-3 missile was not likely to be deployed for "at least five to ten years." Now the CIA believes it will be deployed later this year. With the Russians, as with the Chinese, the Clinton administration has sought to buy good behavior with generous commercial deals and astonishing transfers of advanced U.S. technology. Again and again, both countries have shown they are more than willing to take the prizes--and extremely reluctant to offer anything in exchange, until Congress threatens to upset the applecart by passing new sanctions legislation. The missile and nuclear sales to Iran and to other rogue states continue unabated--and increasingly, U.S. intelligence sources say, the Russians and the Chinese are incorporating U.S. technologies in the products they are offering for sale overseas. Clearly the Clinton export control scandals, which initially focused on satellite technology transferred by the Loral and Hughes Electronics corporations to China (see "Loral Exams," TAS, July 1998), are much broader and deeper than initially thought. And far from buying good behavior, the Clinton administration policy of setting a price for every misdeed is interpreted by more and more companies as simply the price of doing business.

New York Times 9/18/98 Eric Schmitt "In a major rebuke of President Clinton's export policy, House and Senate negotiators agreed Thursday to shift the control over exporting U.S. satellites back to the State Department from the Commerce Department. Some space experts and a senior government auditor have said that controls on exports of satellites to China have been loosened since the administration transferred licensing authority to the less restrictive Commerce Department in 1996, compromising national security. The Commerce Department denies this. Nonetheless, more than 10 House and Senate committees are investigating whether this approach has contributed to the release of sensitive satellite technology and engineering know-how to China that may have helped Beijing improve the reliability of its long-range missiles."

San Jose Mercury News NY Times 9/17/98 "When the Clinton administration relaxed export controls on high-performance computers in 1996, it relied on a flawed report that did not study the national security implications and concluded with scant data that the computers were already easily available around the world, government auditors said Wednesday.. The auditors said ``a key element'' in the decision to relax the export controls was a Stanford University study, commissioned by the Commerce and Defense departments without any competition, that said some U.S. computer technology was uncontrollable worldwide and efforts to control it would harm the industry..Within a year after the export rules were loosened, military installations in Russia and China obtained a few powerful new American computers, prompting criminal investigations. Congress tightened the supercomputer export controls again late last year. ."

New York Times Jeff Gerth 10/19/98 ".According to a 1995 Commerce Department document, the President "made clear," in private conversations he had with Brown, that "he does not believe we have done enough to streamline and liberalize." The document mapped out how Brown should lobby high-level Administration officials to ease controls on computer exports and shift items like communications satellites, engine technology and commercial data-scrambling devices. Such items were on a list of equipment that required a State Department license, and companies believed they could close more deals if authority over the exports were moved to Brown's Commerce Department..Secretary of State Warren Christopher insisted that his department retain jurisdiction. He was overruled in early 1996 by Clinton, opening the way to billions of dollars of satellite sales to Chinese companies. At about the same time, the Administration was weighing whether to lift restrictions on the export of some advanced computers. Officials asked outside consultants to study the issue, and they came back with a report that asserted the controls were pointless. The powerful computers manufactured by American companies would soon be widely available from foreign competitors, the report said. The Administration asked the consultants to assess whether computer sales could pose a threat to the American military. Their report did not take a position, saying the Government did not have enough information to draw a conclusion. This left the issue to Clinton, who decided to fulfill his pledge to the Silicon Valley executives and relax the restrictions..The new rules took effect early in 1996. Soon after, Chinese companies bought 77 of the high-speed computers, which can be used to predict weather patterns but can also scramble secret communications or design powerful nuclear weapons. Disclosure of those sales prompted Congress to reinstate license requirements for some advanced computers. This year, the Central Intelligence Agency and other Federal agencies concluded that at least some of those computers are being used by China's military. The details of their use remain unclear, officials said..Just this month, Congress reversed Clinton's 1996 decision and returned satellite exports to the State Department. At the same time, lawmakers created a senior Pentagon position for technology security after concluding military officials' role in controlling exports to countries like China had been "significantly and improperly reduced over the years." ."

WorldNetDaily 11/23/98 Charles Smith ".The Navy's inability to explain the decision to select a Russian missile over a U.S. made system also involves national security concerns. Navy officials met with congressional representatives and assured them that Boeing and McDonnell Douglas would restrict Russian access to advanced U.S. technology. However, there are allegations that U.S technology has already been given away. The short-range Kh-31 is so dangerous that Boeing and the Navy would not risk a pilot. The problem forced Boeing/Douglas to use a radio controlled F-4 Phantom to carry the missile close enough for firings against Navy ships. Boeing and Russian engineers shared enough data to fit the Kh-31 to a U.S. built fighter in order to fire the missile safely.. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas assured congressional representatives that they take the utmost care in guarding U.S. military secrets. Yet, in 1998 Boeing paid a multi-million dollar fine to the U.S. government for an illegal transfer of advanced missile technology to Russia through their joint SEA-LAUNCH project. McDonnell Douglas is also charged with the illegal transfer of advanced aircraft manufacturing equipment to China. The technology, a giant stretch press for aircraft manufacture, was sold in 1994 to CATIC, a Chinese-state owned corporation, controlled by generals of the People's Liberation Army. The Clinton administration approved the sale to CATIC through the Commerce Department then under Ron Brown. The approval came just before Mr. Brown left on his whirlwind tour of China in August 1994. Federal investigators charged McDonnell Douglas knew the hinese company never had any intention of purchasing the equipment for civilian use because the facility constructed to house the giant machine was put at the Nanchang military aircraft plant. The equipment sent to China is currently manufacturing fighters based on the Russian Su-27 Flanker. Recent photos taken at a Russian airshow displayed a variant of the Su-27 armed with two Kh-31 missiles. China has expressed an interest in the Kh-31 to arm its own jet fighters but acknowledged the short range missile needed improvement.."

Wall Street Journal 11/30/98 ".Michael Maloof is convinced China's military is grabbing sophisticated U.S. technology. His bosses at the Pentagon insist he is crying wolf..Mr. Maloof, a manager in the Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration since 1986, has become a fertile source for hawks seeking evidence of national-security damage. And he is becoming a major headache for Hughes Electronics Corp., which he accuses of knowingly assisting the People's Liberation Army. In 1993, the Clinton administration eased licensing requirements for products -- such as high-speed computers, telecommunications equipment and machine tools -- deemed to have both civilian and military uses. The industry hailed the changes, but some Defense Department bureaucrats accustomed to tight Cold War controls were aghast. It so bothered Mr. Maloof that earlier this year he began keeping a diary of his dealings with Pentagon superiors, which was obtained by The Wall Street Journal. The export control system is now dominated by Commerce Department officials, whose mind-set is much more pro- export...Hard-liners found ammunition earlier this year when it was learned that the Justice Department is investigating whether U.S. satellite makers illegally leaked sensitive missile data to China. During congressional hearings, the DTSA's senior strategic trade adviser, Peter Leitner, echoed many of Mr. Maloof's charges. "What passes for an export-control system has been hijacked by long-time ideological opponents of the very concept," Mr. Leitner claimed. A House panel headed by Republican Christopher Cox of California is probing high-tech exports to China, looking for possible national-security damage. The Pentagon's inspector general is examining procedures at the DTSA. Mr. Maloof has been a major source of information for both. He has told congressional investigators that David Tarbell, DTSA director since 1994, has cut him out of decisions about China, often siding with the pro-export Commerce Department in licensing decisions..Mr. Maloof's criticism of his bosses has included speculating about their relationship with the satellite industry. He wrote June 9 that he met with a Customs agent and "raised concerns for the first time whether Tarbell may be showing unusual favor toward Hughes." ..In a memo this summer to Mr. Tarbell, Mr. Maloof charged Hughes sold satellite ground stations to China that were "supplied and wittingly installed by Hughes for Chinese ground and rocket forces." Mr. Maloof argued in the memo that the ground stations are part of the People's Liberation Army's effort to upgrade encrypted its voice and data communications. Mr. Maloof claimed Mr. Tarbell said the findings weren't "enough to go on." .Officials of Hughes, a separately traded unit of General Motors Corp., acknowledge they often have limited information about their Chinese customers. Hughes said it sold the VSATs to a company called China Electronic Systems Engineering Co., which several U.S. officials say is associated with the Chinese military. It asked that the VSATs be fitted with a special port and circuit boards to load encryption software, Hughes said...Mr Maloof's memos, they say, often draw sweeping conclusions based on thin evidence. Still, some of his findings have been explosive. He discovered recently that in 1994 Hughes had hired the son of Lt. Gen. Shen Rongjun, a senior Chinese military official, while competing for a $600 million contract to sell a civilian communications satellite to a consortium that included People's Liberation Army companies linked to Lt. Gen. Shen. By 1995, Hughes got the contract. In a May 28 entry, Mr. Maloof wrote that the information came to him from an anonymous telephone tip. He confirmed it by checking the DTSA's classified computer database. Embarrassed, Hughes said Jun Shen, a naturalized Canadian with a doctorate in computer science, was indeed an employee but had little to do with the project. The Clinton administration was similarly chagrined. In 1996, it had granted Hughes an export license, but the satellite was never sent due to other problems. Now the administration has delayed issuing a new license, partly because of concerns about People's Liberation Army involvement.."

Softwar 12/1/98 Charles Smith ".In November, the State Department released a detailed 1996 report on U.S. high-tech exports to China as a result of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. But it refused to release another document on Clinton-sponsored exports to China, claiming to do so would threaten the "national defense." The report was written by James Sasser, ambassador to China and former Tennessee senator. Sasser sent his report to the White House, the State Department and the Commerce Department. Sasser, by the way, is the target of an (as yet) unrelated Department of Justice investigation that resulted in 47 indictments against a million-dollar Democratic donor and Sasser associate, Franklin Haney. The Sasser report contradicts Clinton administration claims that advanced communications exports to China were for "civilian" projects. The report states that the Chinese Army was keenly interested in obtaining U.S. communications technology and the purchases were being financed by Far East billionaire, Li Ka- Shing. ."

Softwar 12/1/98 Charles Smith ".According to the GAO, Hua Mei, a joint U.S.-China hotel venture, was no ordinary Chinese "Red Roof" inn. The GAO noted the Chinese partner, Galaxy New Technology, was also owned and operated by the Chinese Army. "In 1993, SCM Brooks Telecommunications entered into a joint venture with Galaxy New Technology, a Chinese company controlled by the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), an agency of the Chinese military," the report said. COSTIND, according to the GAO, "oversees development of China's weapons systems and is responsible for identifying and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for military use." The recently released 1996 report written by Sasser states that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was also directly involved in the so-called "civilian" Chinese fiber optic communication systems. Sasser's report noted that the PLA actively worked on an MPT fiber optic network that the Clinton administration stated was "civil" for the House National Security Committee."

Softwar 12/1/98 Charles Smith ".In 1997, Rep. Henry Hyde wrote Attorney General Reno a letter outlining his concerns about Galaxy New Technology. According to Hyde, "In 1994, sophisticated telecommunications technology was transferred to a U.S.-Chinese joint venture called HUA MEI, in which the Chinese partner is an entity controlled by the Chinese military. This particular transfer included fiber- optic communications equipment which is used for high-speed, secure communications over long distances. Also included in the package was advanced encryption software." However, in 1996, Defense Department officials were adamant that there was no need to check the Chinese firm, Galaxy New Technology, since it was led by a civilian, Madam Nie Lie. Still, DoD officials did admit that Galaxy New Technology head Madam Nie Lie was also the wife of Chinese Army General Ding Henggao, commander of the Chinese unit COSTIND. Galaxy New Technology staff wear green, have little red stars and they kill for a living. In fact, the so called "civilian" firm was heavily laced with Chinese Army officers and experts. One member of Galaxy New Technology management, according to the 1996 Defense Department report, was Director and President "Mr. Deng Changru". Mr. Deng Changru is better known as Lt. Colonel Deng Changru of the People's Liberation Army, head of the PLA communications corps. Another interesting staff member from Galaxy New Technology was co- General Manager "Mr. Xie Zhichao." Lt. Colonel Xie Zhichao, is also the Director of the COSTIND Electronics Design Bureau.."

ABCNEWS.com 12/2/98 ".In a special 20/20 investigation, Chris Wallace reports on the possible transfer of sensitive American technology to the Chinese, on 20/20 Wednesday, Dec. 2 (10-11 p.m., EST). In an exclusive interview with 20/20, a former U.S. government monitor alleges that national security has been compromised by American aerospace companies which went to China to launch their satellites on Chinese rockets. In his first public interview, Lt. Col. Al Coates, who was responsible for monitoring American companies in China, tells Mr. Wallace, "They want to get the job done. They don't consider it helping the Chinese. They consider it getting their payload and getting their job accomplished." Lt. Col. Coates tells 20/20 that he sent numerous reports of infractions back to U.S. government officials, but did not receive any responses. The infractions ranged from what Coates deemed inadequate security at work locations to U.S. personnel getting into subjects he considered off limits during working meetings with the Chinese. Out of frustration, Coates quit the Air Force last month, after 29 years of service.

ABC.Com 12/3/98 20/20 ".Wallace: Did Hughes put American national security at risk? Coates: I believe they did, and I think they put them at risk for profit. Wallace: It's a pretty tough thing to say about an American corporation? Coates: But if you accept the mentality that you're doing it strictly for commercial nature of launching Communication satellites, then I guess you can have a clear conscience. Hughes denies that its personnel compromised national security. In a statement to 20/20, Hughes said the U.S. government never told the company of any violations. "We can only assume that if Mr. Coates communicated these incidents to his superiors, they were deemed unworthy of passing on to us."."

Softwar Website 12/7/98 Charles Smith ".Reinsch wants to re-apply his vast technical expertise to oversee more military exports such as satellites. However, Reinsch, according to his own bio, HAS NO technical expertise in military technology. His only business experience is in running housing for the elderly in southern Maryland.."

Defense News 12/8/98 Barbara Opall-Rom ". White House and Commerce Department officials are crafting an end run around much of the government's national security bureaucracy with a plan to inject business interests into the arms export licensing process. Prepared in coordination with the U.S. aerospace industry, the plan is to be presented in an executive order by President Bill Clinton early next year. It would give Commerce officials the right to appeal State Department decisions governing export of satellites and other items appearing on the so-called Munitions List. The list is a category of sensitive technologies requiring the highest level of scrutiny by the U.S. government. State Department, Pentagon and congressional critics say the planned executive order will dilute the restrictive nature of Munitions List items administered through the Arms Export Control Act. Moreover, they say it violates the intent of the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act, which transferred authority for satellite and related exports from Commerce to State in response to congressional concerns of inappropriate technology transfers to China. "The intent of Congress with placing satellites back on the Munitions List was to inject more rigor into the export review process. Instead, the administration appears to be intent on dumbing down the State Department process," Marc Thiessen, a spokesman for Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told Defense News Dec. 4. Rep. Benjamin Gilman, R-N.Y., chairman of the House International Relations Committee, warned Dec. 4 that such exports "should be guided by those agencies which ... give an overriding priority to national security considerations."."

E-Mail 12/20/98 Charles Smith ".The Pentagon -U.S. war-planners are not all that happy with operation DESERT FOX. The strike was telegraphed to Iraq far in advance and mostof the Iraqi mobile Surface to Air missile (SAM) units escapeddamage. The prime target for U.S. strikes, the IraqiIntegrated Air Defense network (NATO code-name "Tiger Song"), suffered no major damage and appears to have lost no missile units. The only real "hard target" kills that can be claimed are a few attack helicopters destroyed at a northern Iraqi air-base. Ironically, the Iraqi "Tiger Song" system was built using American and French parts exported to China. Iraq purchased the encrypted - secure - fiber optic system from the Chinese Army in 1996. The Clinton administration authorized the exports of a secure, fiber optic, communication systems to China in 1994. According to the GAO, Clinton also authorized the export of an encrypted - secure - air control system directly to the Chinese Air Force using a Presidential waiver.."

New York Times Jeff Gerth 1/22/99 Freeper Jolly ". The State Department told Congress Thursday that the Commerce Department would have a voice but not a vote in approving the export of American-made satellites.. President Clinton originally opposed the measure but it was part of the military budget that he signed last fall. The president's strong opposition had prompted senior congressional Republicans to warn the president last month not to undermine the intent of the law by giving the Commerce Department a significant role in the process...The new law takes effect in mid-March, three years after Clinton initially decided to make the Commerce Department responsible for satellite exports. In October 1995, after a review, the secretary of state concluded that satellites should stay under his jurisdiction. The Commerce Department appealed to the White House, and the 1995 decision was reversed. ."

New York Times 2/23/99 Jeff Gerth David Sanger "...Swayed by criticisms that commercial satellite deals with China could threaten national security, the Clinton administration decided on Monday to reject the sale of a $450 million satellite to a consortium with close ties to the Chinese government, senior administration officials said. The decision cast considerable doubt on the future of high technology sales useful to the Chinese....The decision came after the Defense and State Departments objected to allowing China to launch the satellite. Overruling the Commerce Department, which had favored the sale, the State and Defense officials concluded that the technology to place the satellite in orbit would help the Chinese military make its intercontinental ballistic missile fleet more accurate. Some experts also feared that that Chinese military would benefit, both commercially and technologically, by controlling the satellite once it was in orbit. The deal involves a Hughes Space and Communications satellite designed to set up a mobile telephone network over much of Asia, reaching from China to Indonesia, and then across the Indian Ocean as far as Pakistan...The decision effectively revokes President Clinton's quiet approval of the sale two and a half years ago. At the time, Clinton's aides assured him it would not contribute to Chinese military capabilities. The State Department and the Defense Department concurred with the decision, but had not thoroughly vetted the military links of the Singapore-based consortium, which was the official buyer of the satellite. Top officials of the consortium included top military officers of the People's Liberation Army, who also served in posts with the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control Corp....At a high level interagency meeting on Feb. 11, the Pentagon said it was troubled by the involvement of the Chinese military in the regional satellite system, called Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications, an official said. The State Department's concerns at the meeting included questions about Hughes' dealings in recent years with China, the official added. One troubling episode involved a 1995 tutorial on rocket launching given by Hughes engineers to Chinese scientists, now the subject of a criminal inquiry. Another involved the company's hiring of the son of the Chinese general who oversees his country's military satellite programs, officials said....At the time of the company's questioned deals with China, its chairman was C. Michael Armstrong, who also served as head of Clinton's export advisory council, a group of private-sector executives and labor leaders who advice the administration on trade policy. Armstrong now heads AT&T...."

Newsweek 3/15/99 Michael Hirsh "…For U.S. manufacturers of high-performance computers, satellites and other "dual-use" goods—advanced technology with possible weapons applications—the fallout could be dire. "When the lid comes off the Cox report, there's going to be an explosion of [public] outrage," warns Dana Rohrabacher, a conservative Republican from California. A Senate committee is expected to release similar findings soon. And the main victim of this new anxiety over national security may well be America's computer-export market—especially for supercomputers. Why supercomputers? NEWSWEEK has learned that the main thrust of the Cox report will not be the transfer of satellite and missile capability—the issue that prompted the probe last June—but theft from U.S. nuclear labs. In the mid- to late '80s, Chinese operatives allegedly gained knowledge of the top-secret W-88 nuclear warhead. Supercomputers can help transform such nuclear secrets into state-of-the-art weapons—in the case of the W-88, by miniaturizing the warhead so that several can fit on a single missile. Sources close to Cox say he is also worried that China and other potentially unfriendly nations will use supercomputers or "superclusters" of high-end computers to do "virtual" nuclear testing. That would allow them to evade the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty…. "

Washington Post 3/9/99 Michael Laris "… Over the past 13 months, the U.S. government received 512 requests to export high performance computers to China, 70 of which were denied, according to the Commerce Department. Several of the denials were reversed on appeal. The actual number of shipments to China was substantially lower because some deals fell through, bringing the total of deliveries last year to 191. Powerful U.S. computers are used here for everything from sorting mail to running e-commerce businesses. The problem is that American computers and the tiny microchips that drive them are getting faster every day -- and cheaper. The U.S. government has concentrated its efforts on controlling exports of the 500 fastest American-made computers -- supercomputers that cost tens of millions of dollars each. These are the machines that the Department of Energy uses to manage the U.S. nuclear arsenal and that could pose the greatest danger in foreign hands, said William Reinsch, the Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration and an outspoken advocate of increased high-technology sales abroad. "The problem is, No. 500 keeps going up in capability," he said, adding that the calculating speed of No. 500 will nearly double this year from 11,000 to 20,000 MTOPS. "When the high end is going up that rapidly, you have to make adjustments to continue your ability to do that. Otherwise, what we are doing is controlling low-end PCs."…"I can't tell you there are no national security implications to exporting high performance computers," Reinsch said. "There are national security implications to exporting personal computers. . . . We have to weigh costs and benefits. We also have to weigh controllability." Reinsch's critics say his brand of pragmatism is dangerous, that U.S. computer companies are basically more concerned with the bottom line than national security. Peter Leitner, an official with the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is one of those critics. "By simply decontrolling these things in response to technological development," he said, "there is a real cost . . . that is going to be borne by the taxpayer, going to be borne by young people who are going to be killed unnecessarily in the future when they come up against a weapons system that is more sophisticated than it had to be." Many of the common tools of intelligence gathering will be rendered useless if key weapons testing in China is done on powerful computers with sophisticated software, rather than in actual performance tests, Leitner said…. "

The Union Leader 3/16/99 Richard Lessner "…It is hardly surprising that the Clinton administration, informed in April 1996 that a Red Chinese agent had penetrated our super-secret Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory, did nothing. Consider that was going on in 1996: In the spring of that year, the Clinton-Gore re-election campaign and the Democratic National Committee -- the two by then were nearly indistinguishable -- were smack in the middle of a huge international fundraising effort facilitated by a cast of shady Asian businessmen, organized crime figures and agents of the People's Republic of China. Millions of dollars were being raised from these foreign sources to pay for Dick Morris' stealth media campaign that buried the hapless Bob Dole and turned Bill Clinton's re-election into a walkover. So in the middle of all this, is it any wonder that Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger did nothing when investigators told him in April 1996 of the Red Chinese penetration at Los Alamos? Is it mere coincidence that Mr. Berger learned our nuclear security had been compromised the same month (on the 29th) that Al Gore was holding a gala fund-raiser at a Buddhist temple in California, at which hundreds of thousands of dollars were illegally funneled into the Clinton-Gore campaign from Asian sources with connections to Beijing? Then there is Mr. Berger himself. It now is known from White House documents obtained by congressional investigators that as deputy national security advisor it was Mr. Berger who led the fight inside the administration in 1995 to shift responsibility for export controls on satellite technology from the State to the Commerce Department. This transfer of control to the late Ron Brown's more "user friendly" Commerce -- a change opposed by the Pentagon and Secretary of State Warren Christopher -- was rewarded by millions in campaign contributions from the Loral and Hughes Aerospace corporations. And it was Mr. Berger who pressed Bill Clinton to provide Loral and Hughes with export-control waivers that allowed the companies to transfer sensitive satellite technology to the Red Chinese, this despite an on-going Justice Department and FBI investigation into their activities. So much for Sandy Berger's interest, his title notwithstanding, in national security…."

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY 3/22/99 Brian Mitchell "…Starting in 1993, the Clinton administration began dismantling controls on the sale of technology with possible military uses. It also transferred responsibility for reviewing sensitive exports from the State Department to Commerce. The relaxation of controls has been a boon to high-tech companies, but it also has bolstered China's military capabilities. In late 1993, China acquired from McDonnell-Douglas a factory full of giant computer-controlled machine tools used to make high-performance aircraft. China also has acquired high-speed telecommunications equipment, supercomputers and satellite technology. In 1996, Loral Space Systems and Hughes Electronics helped China correct a fatal flaw in the guidance system of its Long March missile. This prompted a federal grand jury investigation into possible export-control violations. But in February 1998, Clinton let Loral and Hughes off the hook by granting them a waiver on the transfer of similar missile-guidance technology to China. With the help of Loral and Hughes, China was able to perfect the Long March. In 1994, Clinton adopted a less favorable policy toward Taiwan, downgrading Taiwan's status vis-a-vis China. The State Department even tried to keep high-level Taiwanese officials from visiting the U.S., but was overruled by Congress. In 1996, China tried to intimidate Taiwanese voters, in an election between pro-Beijing and pro-independence candidates, by lobbing missiles over the island. The U.S. responded by sending the carriers Nimitz and Independence to the Taiwan Strait….."

Washington Times 3/31/99 Timothy Burn "…Details contained in a potentially explosive report on China's theft of U.S. nuclear secrets could ruin Clinton administration efforts to make it easier to sell advanced technology to other countries. …The Commerce Department is working on a proposal to ease supercomputer-export controls, but the plan likely will face strong opposition in Congress….."Because of the possible illicit transfer of technology, many Washington veterans have told me this is the worst climate for high-tech trade with China in 20 years," Mr. Daley told the Beijing-based U.S. business community. "The ... report, to be released by Congress soon, will no doubt be used by some as an excuse for tightening controls. Some export licenses may be more difficult to obtain -- especially if an organization had even minor involvement with the military," he told the American Chamber of Commerce….. In 1997, the House National Security Committee released a report that revealed the Russian ministry in charge of building nuclear weapons had illegally obtained U.S. supercomputers……In the midst of these security concerns, the Clinton administration has continued efforts to revise Cold War-era export-control regulations in the light of swift advances in computer technology. The changes, which were implemented in 1994, raised the level on the speed of computers that could be exported without a license from 195 million theoretical operations per minute (MTOP) to 1,500 MTOP…...But in 1997, mainly because of increased security concerns after the technology transfers to Russia, Congress modified the president's export-control rules as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. As it stands now, Congress requires exporters to notify the Commerce Department of exports to end-users in "Tier III" countries, a group of 50 nuclear-risk countries, including Russia, China and Israel. Agencies involved in export control, like Commerce, the Defense Department and the State Department, have 10 days to object to a sale…...Commercially available computers are five times faster than they were in 1996. Intel Corp., for instance, plans next year to release its Merced microprocessor that operates at 5,622 MTOP, well above the current export limit….."

World Net Daily 4/2/99 Jon Dougherty "...A former stockholder in a now--defunct commercial space company said, "there is every indication" that the current crisis involving the transfers of U.S. military technology to China had its roots in the late 1980s. The source, who requested anonymity, told WorldNetDaily that the company -- Space Commerce -- tried unsuccessfully "back during the Reagan and Bush years" to get contracts to launch U.S. satellites in the former Soviet Union. The source said Space Commerce had a partnership arrangement with a Soviet space counterpart called Glavkosmos, which he said was "akin to our version of NASA." Though there were "a number of organizations in the Soviet Union that were related to their space program," Glavkosmos "had the ability to sell satellite sights on Soviet Proton rockets -- in other words, to sell launches," explained the source.....

Sometime in the late 1980s, the source said, Hughes Electronics -- now implicated in the Clinton administration "Chinagate" scandal -- approached Space Commerce with a proposal to launch two commercial satellites. Hughes made a "substantial down payment to buy these two launches," and the source said company executives informed shareholders that the Hughes satellites only "contained technology that was already readily available." "They told us you could go down to the local library and get the technology," the source said The deal between Space Commerce and Hughes specified that the launches would take place aboard Proton rockets in the Soviet Union, so the space company applied for the necessary permits from the U.S. government. However, the Bush administration would not allow Hughes to export the satellites to the USSR for launching because of a possible compromise of technology.

"For years afterward," the source continued, "because of a concern about a transfer of technology, the company could not get an export license to export the satellites to Russia." As a result, "Space Commerce spent a great deal of time, effort and all our money trying to lobby to get those permits." The source said, "I believe that Hughes also tried to lobby the government to get them as well," but neither company was successful. When it was over, the satellites could not be launched and "the company went belly-up," the source said, having spent all of its money lobbying for permission to launch. Shortly after Space Commerce went defunct "in the early 1990s," Hughes was finally granted permission to launch those satellites instead "on the Chinese Long March rocket" in mainland China...."

Washington Times 4/5/99 Barbara J Saffir "...In a fateful sign of the new mission -- over objections from the State Department -- Mr. Clinton in 1996 switched oversight of export licenses for satellites and other technology to China to Mr. Brown's business-friendly department. Satellite deals by Loral and others would become the focus of harsh criticism in Congress that key military technology had been essentially handed over to the Chinese. "We saw the administration's national security process at work ... and it was overridden on the recommendation of Ron Brown," Mr. Christopher said at the time.

William Norman Grigg 7/6/99 "…Corporations lusting for Beijing's business have taken notice of the Clinton Administration's decimation of export controls. In a dispatch from Beijing, the May 24th Washington Post observed: "Almost nine years after the United States slapped an embargo on the sale of military technology to China after the crackdown on student-led protests in Tiananmen Square, U.S. defense contractors are doing what few thought possible: preparing for the easing of these restrictions. Even as a controversy exploded in Washington ... over allegations that the Clinton administration allowed American companies to pass sensitive missile technology to China, five prominent U.S. companies participated in China's first defense electronics trade show in a Beijing exhibition hall."…"

Source: Departments of Commerce and Defense. http://www.ap.harvard.edu/awe/main/index.html 4/12/99 "... The addition of new controls over satellites transferred to Commerce's jurisdiction in 1996 addressed some of the key areas where the Commerce procedures are less stringent than those at State. There remain, however, differences in how the export of satellites are controlled under these new procedures. -- Congressional notification requirements no longer apply, although the Congress is currently notified because of the Tiananmen waiver process. -- Sanctions do not always apply to items under Commerce's jurisdiction. For example, under the 1993 Missile Technology sanctions, sanctions were not imposed on satellites that include missile-related components. -- Defense's power to influence the decision-making process has diminished since the transfer. When under State jurisdiction, State and Defense officials stated that State would routinely defer to the recommendations of Defense if national security concerns are raised. Under Commerce jurisdiction, Defense must now either persuade a majority of other agencies to agree with its position to stop an export or escalate their objection to the cabinet-level Export Administration Review Board, an event that has not occurred in recent years. -- Technical information may not be as clearly controlled under the Commerce system. Unlike State, Commerce does not require a company to obtain an export license to market a satellite. Commerce regulations also do not have a separate export commodity control category for technical data, leaving it unclear how this information is licensed. Commerce has informed one large satellite maker that some of this technical data does not require an individual license. Without clear licensing requirements for technical information, Defense does not have an opportunity to review the need for monitors and safeguards or attend technical meetings to ensure that sensitive information is not inadvertently disclosed...."

World Net Daily through Softwar.net 4/13/99 through E-Mail Alert "... According to a May 1995 CSPP document sent to Ron Brown, "controls on computer exports to Russia and China for commercial, civil end-users should be eliminated; controls on exports for actual military end-uses may be appropriate until there is greater certainty that neither country poses a threat to U.S. national security." ...According to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) the Commerce Dept. was required to make public disclosure if a government agency consults advisors who are not government employees. FACA was established to force Federal officials to hold formal policy meetings in public, instead of meeting with special interests, lobbyists and industry behind closed doors. The Commerce Dept. was legally obliged to offer open access to the public, media and other qualified individuals the same access as the members of the CSPP - who are NOT members of the Federal Government. Instead, the Commerce Dept. engaged in a cover-up of the secret meetings with the CSPP and Podesta Associates employees at the White House. No notification was issued for the secret meetings, nor the classified materials offered to any other company...."

The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...Similarly, prior to January 1996, when computer export controls were lifted after intensive lobbying from Silicon Graphics and other top DNC contributors, the Chinese had only three U.S. High Performance Computers (HPCs), all of which were subject to stringent Defense Department monitoring. In April 1997-- just 14 months after the decontrol--Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch told Congress that U.S. companies had sold 46 supercomputers to Chinese end-users, and that the Chinese were not allowing the U.S. government to verify how they were being used. By June 1997, concerned that we were helping the PLA to improve weapons design, missile targeting, and nuclear simulation, the House voted to restore licensing requirements on HPCs. But the measure was ultimately defeated under intense industry and administration pressure. In January 1999, Reinsch's Bureau of Export Administration delivered its first congressionally mandated report detailing supercomputer exports over the preceding 12 months. Out of a total of 390 HPCs exported by the United States during that period, 191 of them had gone to China. Despite U.S. efforts, the Chinese only allowed government officials to inspect three of them once they had reached China. Congressional sources tell TAS that they have been told by administration officials that as many as 600 HPCs have been sold to the Chinese since the 1996 decontrols--more raw computing power than can be found in the Pentagon and the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons labs, combined. ..."

The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...I have been investigating Chinese high-tech espionage activities in the United States since 1993, and discovered early on just how sensitive a subject this can be. As a congressional staffer working for California Democrat Tom Lantos, I requested licensing records of U.S. high-tech exports to China from the Department of Commerce. When Commerce finally delivered the several- thousand-page print-out to the Rayburn House Office building in late March 1993, I was prevented for three weeks from even looking it over, despite the fact that the information was not classified. ...They did not want the story to leak out of just how much dual- use technology U.S. companies had been allowed to sell to the Chinese military, for fear that would impede the U.S.-China high-tech pipeline. Unbeknownst to most people at the time was a plan devised by top Clinton administration appointees to lift export controls on a wide range of strategic technologies. The plan was first laid out in a 1992 National Academy of Sciences study authored by William Perry, Ashton Carter, and Mitchel Wallerstein, who all went on to top Pentagon jobs under Clinton. Calling export controls a "wasting asset," they argued that for U.S. high- tech firms to maintain a technological edge over their foreign competitors they needed to be allowed to export ever-more sophisticated equipment, so they could plow those profits into developing new technologies..... After the election, William Perry became deputy secretary of defense and went to work putting the plan into action within the bureaucracy. Ron Brown, as secretary of commerce, was tasked with selling the decontrols to corporate America and Congress as part of an administration-wide "Trade Promotion" package, aimed at creating jobs and "growing" U.S. exports. On September 30, 1993, Brown issued a landmark report, "Toward a National Export Strategy," which first made the argument--oft-repeated until the Loral-Hughes satellite scandals erupted last year--that each additional $1 billion in U.S. exports creates 20,000 jobs in the U.S..... In 1993 and 1994 the administration tried to rewrite the EAA to eliminate most controls, but Congress balked; so they simply made an end run around the law, and dismantled the controls through executive branch regulations. The administration's efforts reduced the voluminous licensing lists I had once received, and Defense Department officials now complain there are no more records of what has been shipped to the Chinese military--and thus no way to gauge the damage to U.S. national security. Like small-time hoods dreaming of the perfect crime, Clinton's "best and brightest" thought they had covered up all traces of their acts...."

The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...Supercomputers are only one element in a deadly mix of high technologies released for sale to the Chinese by the Clinton administration since 1993. An internal memorandum written by Michael Maloof of the Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), subpoenaed by the Cox committee, paints an astonishing picture of the cumulative impact of U.S. technology transfer to the Chinese military over the past five years. The combination of supercomputers, satellite sales, and advanced telecommunications switching technology since 1994 "have provided the Chinese military with a nationwide encrypted command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) network that will serve it well into the next century," Maloof warned his superiors. "Together, they provide the PLA with a communications infrastructure that it could not have developed on its own." Extensive manufacturing technologies were decontrolled along with the actual products U.S. companies were allowed to ship to China. Since 1993, the PLA has been importing massive amounts of equipment to manufacture fiber- optics cable, which allows for secure communications links impervious to electronic eavesdropping. And companies tied to former colleagues of then- Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry led the way in transferring encrypted Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) telephone switching equipment, now used by the PLA for its military communications network. "The decision to allow... ATM switching technology in 1994 occurred over the objection of DoD technical experts," Maloof wrote. "Despite initial NSA concerns, it was silent when the decision finally occurred." As I wrote in "Peking Pentagon" in April 1996, it appeared that William Perry personally intervened to get NSA to drop their objections to the sale of this technology, despite the fact that the Chinese buyer was a PLA-owned company....."

New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...The state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful for uranium prospecting made by International Imaging Systems, a California company. China National Nuclear then helped Iran prospect for uranium that American intelligence officials believe will be used in making nuclear weapons...."

New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...The state-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which manufactures China's newest anti-ship cruise missiles, was allowed to buy a computer system that is useful for simulating wind effects. Not only did these missiles strengthen the Chinese military, but the company has also exported some to Iran, where, according to the United States naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten our personnel...."

New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to buy equipment from the Convex Computer Corporation (which has since been bought by Hewlett-Packard) for processing data from an experimental fusion reactor. The academy then exported the reactor to Iran, where it is used for training nuclear scientists...."

New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...American equipment was approved for export to the National University of Defense Technology, which helps the People's Liberation Army design advanced weapons; the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation and flight dynamics. (The licensing records do not reveal whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but there is no reason to think they weren't.) ..."

New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...In the decade we studied, American companies were also licensed to sell China a great deal of noncomputer equipment that could be used for weaponry. This included $241 million worth of machinery for making special semiconductors that can go into missiles, torpedoes, smart munitions, fuses and secure communications equipment; $131 million worth of high-speed oscilloscopes, which can record data from nuclear weapon tests, help design nuclear weapon firing circuits and develop missile guidance systems; $111 million worth of high-accuracy machine tools that can produce the precision parts needed for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and $5.4 million worth of vibration-testing equipment, which can enable nuclear weapons and missiles to withstand shock, impact and rapid acceleration...."

Reuters 5/5/99 "...The Senate Intelligence Committee Wednesday approved a report on its investigation into how U.S. satellite exports to China affected America's national security and will release it soon, senators said. The investigation into technology transfers was triggered by reports that China acquired secret missile technology as part of the commercial use of Chinese rockets to launch U.S. satellites into space. The report on the committee's investigation will be made public after national security agencies decide releasing the information would not harm U.S. security. The report also looked into allegations that China tried to influence U.S. policy through election campaign contributions. It does not cover the scandal over allegations of Chinese spying at U.S. nuclear weapons research laboratories. "The China report has been adopted by the intelligence committee by an overwhelming vote,'' Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby, an Alabama Republican, said..... Asked whether the Senate report was critical of President Clinton's policies, Kerrey replied: "It's certainly not a love letter. It's a candid evaluation of what went wrong and it makes no attempt to target the president.'' Monitoring and oversight had been weak, he said. "There was an inherent conflict in this policy. It is in our interest to have China in their launch, when they're doing commercial launches, to be as ineffective as possible. It's in our interest to have their performance be very, very low because they can transfer it over to the military side,'' Kerrey said....."

Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES 5/7/99 "....The bipartisan committee report sets out that the Chinese government is engaged in a covert operation aimed at influencing U.S. policies. "Technical analyses and methodologies provided by American satellite companies to the [People's Republic of China] during various satellite-launch campaigns result in the transfer to the PRC of technical knowhow," the report says. "Such transfer enables the PRC to improve its present and future space launch vehicles and intercontinental ballistic missiles." A senior Republican Senate aide said the report "confirms our worst fears" about the Clinton administration's policy of loosening satellite-export controls and trying to deal with aggressive Chinese spying on technology. "China developed and implemented a covert-action plan to influence U.S. policy and through illegal campaign contributions sought to loosen controls on critical technologies," the aide said. "And it worked." The aide said technology transfers to China "damaged national security" because "Chinese rockets are now or will become more reliable, more deadly and more potent and could be used against the United States." The report says there is evidence that U.S. satellite technology "was incorporated into the PRC space-launch program," and the panel assumed that "any improvements in the PRC's space-launch vehicles would be incorporated wherever practicable in the PRC's military ballistic missile program. "The committee concludes that the technical information transferred during satellite-launch campaigns enables the PRC to improve its present and future space-launch vehicles and ICBMs." If Beijing uses the space technology in its growing force of strategic intermediate-range and short-range missiles, "national security will have been damaged," the report says. "The committee believes . . . the PRC will use the transferred information to improve its short-range ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and related technology. These missiles could threaten U.S. forces stationed in Japan and Korea, as well as allies in the region."

Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES 5/7/99 "...The intelligence committee says the CIA regards space launchers as "missiles in disguise," and notes that the Chinese Long March space booster "shares components with the PRC's CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile," most of which are targeted at U.S. cities.... Chung received a $300,000 donation from a Chinese aerospace company that contributed to President Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign. According to the committee, China in 1995 launched "a plan to influence the U.S. political process favorably toward that country. . . . The plan was an official PRC plan, and funds were made available for its implementation." The report says the CIA failed to recognize "the scope of PRC efforts to influence our foreign policy and our elections." It recommended increased efforts to monitor Chinese political-influence operations. .... The Clinton administration transferred jurisdiction for licensing commercial satellites from the State Department to the Commerce Department, which subordinated national security to business interests, the committee says.

Associated Press 5/6/99 "...The Senate Intelligence Committee has concluded in a bipartisan report that the Clinton administration was lax in protecting U.S. missile technology from leaking to China through commercial satellite exports. .... It focuses on a policy that began during the Reagan and Bush administrations and was enthusiastically embraced by Clinton to let U.S. companies ship their commercial satellites to China for launch atop Chinese rockets. U.S. companies needed access to Chinese rockets because of a shortage of rockets for commercial launches in the United States. But after several launch failures, insurance companies underwriting the launches questioned the reliability of Chinese rockets. U.S. satellite makers such as Hughes Electronics and Loral Space & Communications participated in studies and reviews that examined possible causes for the failures. The American companies denied any wrongdoing, but Pentagon officials and a subsequent House review concluded that China had gained valuable missile-related know-how from these reviews. The rockets used by China to launch commercial payloads, according to U.S. intelligence, are all but identical to China's ICBMs. Shelby said the report was adopted in a near-unanimous vote of the intelligence committee members. He did not provide the final tally.....Democrats battled Republican committee members to produce a report that could win bipartisan approval. As a result, some of the tougher language of earlier drafts was scrubbed out, according to Kerrey. The report also examined allegations that the Chinese government was involved in funneling money illegally into U.S. political campaigns, particularly to the Democratic Party, and that the effort revolved around gaining influence over key foreign policy and trade matters. An official familiar with the report said it finds no direct link between China's involvement in contributing to campaigns and the satellite export issue...."

World Tribune.com 5/10/99 Middle East News Line "...The Clinton administration has acknowledged that despite Beijing's pledges Chinese companies are still helping Iran's intermediate ballistic missile program. The administration -- responding to a congressional report by Senator Richard Shelby, an Alabama Republican, about Chinese proliferation -- said China continues to help Iran's nuclear program. "We are concerned, in many respects, about certain Chinese entities that may provide technology - especially to Iran and Pakistan," State Department spokesman James Rubin on Friday, "and we have made those concerns made to the Chinese leadership at the highest levels, including most recently in Premier Zhu's visit. We will continue to work with China to bring its policies and practices more and more in line with international norms.".....Rubin also acknowledged U.S. concerns that despite its commitments Beijing is transferring missile technology to North Korea. "We do have concerns that they are seeking certain technology -- materials called "specialty steel" that can be used in their missile program," he said. "We have heard reports to that effect. We're concerned by those reports. We've raised this issue directly with the Chinese and we're going to be following it very closely." Chaired by Shelby, the Senate Intelligence Committee report said Clinton administration officials and certain U.S. aerospace companies joined to allow unlicensed and unauthorized transfers of U.S. technology to China. "We left the door open for the PRC to abscond with a lot of our most advanced space technologies, and we may never know the full extent of what they got," Shelby said on Friday. "All of you probably realize that the PRC [People's Republic of China] is one of the world's worst proliferators of missiles and missile technology to potential U.S. adversaries and to other unstable parts of the world. The committee found that these missiles may now benefit from U.S. technology."..."

WorldNetDaily 5/11/99 Charles R Smith "...A 1997 Commerce e-mail to Frank Deliberti at the Commerce Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) from Robert Bannerman in Beijing states, "This list, called 'China's Defense-Industrial Trading Organizations' published by DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), was posted in several places in the BXA/OEE section I worked in a year ago." "I used the chart to discover that Yuanwang Group," continued Bannerman. "The importer that is alleged to have imported the Sun Computer shipped to the National Defense Technical Institute of China in Changsha was directly under the control of COSTIND. I keep a copy of this chart in my files." The Commerce Department knew computers were being sold directly to the Chinese army. The U.S. Commerce Department acted as a contact point for both the PLA buyers and the American computer manufacturers. The same PLA-owned Yuanwang Corp. that Commerce would push as an official contact in 1995 for peaceful "defense" conversion projects, acquired high-speed Sun computers for the Chinese army in 1997. According to another document from the Commerce Department, Defense Secretary Perry had promised Ding, "a Cray super-computer to be used directly by the Chinese weapons establishment to help design newer and safer nukes."

WorldNetDaily 5/11/99 Charles R Smith "...In 1995, eager to make new foreign sales, Cray sales representatives traveled to Beijing to meet with PLA officers during a Commerce-sponsored event. In 1995, Cray attended the "JCCT Meeting" in China. The Joint U.S.-China Technology summit held in October 1995 in Beijing, included major American defense computer manufacturers such as IBM, SUN, Apple, Digital, Silicon Graphics and Cray. Nor was China's missile program left begging for CPU power. In 1994, Tandem Corp. exported computers to China Great Wall Corp., a company owned by the Chinese army, during a Ron Brown trade trip. Commerce documents show that China Great Wall Industry is owned by "China Electronics Systems Engineering Company (CESEC), a subsidiary of the People's Liberation Army."..."

WorldNetDaily 5/11/99 Charles R Smith "...In 1993, Great Wall, along with nine other PLA-controlled companies, sold nuclear tipped M-9 missiles to Pakistan. In response, Great Wall was banned from purchasing U.S.-controlled technology such as computers. Yet, only a few months later, Great Wall was allowed to buy over $100 million of U.S. computers. Tandem Corp. CEO James Treybig attended an August 1994 presidential trade mission to Beijing with Ron Brown. A Brown trade mission document states, "Tandem and China Great Wall Industry will announce in August their joint venture." Another document found in the files of former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown states that Treybig "negotiated a $100 million dollar joint venture for Tandem Computers while in China." The PLA purchase of U.S. computer power was the perfect cap to Chinese nuclear espionage operations against America...."

San Diego Union-Tribune 5/16/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...Even after stealing the plan for an advanced warhead, one would need high-performance equipment to manufacture and test its precision parts. Sadly, China is getting those machines from the United States -- and it doesn't even have to steal them. A study we recently completed shows that the Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive exports to China in the last decade. Although supposedly intended for civilian purposes, the department's records show that much of this "dual-use" equipment went directly to nuclear missile and military sites, the vertebrae of China's strategic backbone. And unbeknownst to the American suppliers, several of these Chinese companies later sold nuclear and other military equipment to Iran and Pakistan, according to American intelligence reports and news accounts. More than half of the $15 billion in exports consisted of computers. China had been denied access to high-performance computers until President Clinton loosened computer controls in 1996, after strenuous lobbying by his political supporters in Silicon Valley. Then a flood of computer exports began. By now China has imported about 400 high-performance machines, just what would be needed to process the American nuclear codes and simulate the workings of our arsenal. Although China has insisted that these computers were imported for civilian uses, it has refused virtually all requests to let United States officials see what the machines are really doing. In all, the military and strategic value of what China got from the Commerce Department was at least as great as what it may have gotten from spies....."

San Diego Union-Tribune 5/16/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...*American equipment was approved for export to the National University of Defense Technology, which helps the People's Liberation Army design advanced weapons; the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation and flight dynamics. (The licensing records do not reveal whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but there is no reason to think they weren't.)..."

San Diego Union-Tribune 5/16/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...In the decade we studied, American companies also were licensed to sell China a great deal of noncomputer equipment that could be used for weaponry. This included $241 million worth of machinery for making special semiconductors that can go into missiles, torpedoes, smart munitions, fuses and secure communications equipment; $131 million worth of high-speed oscilloscopes, which can record data from nuclear weapon tests, help design nuclear weapon firing circuits and develop missile guidance systems; $111 million worth of high-accuracy machine tools that can produce the precision parts needed for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and $5.4 million worth of vibration-testing equipment, which can enable nuclear weapons and missiles to withstand shock, impact and rapid acceleration..."

Koenig's International News 5/18/99 Charles Smith "...According to a 1997 report forced from the U.S. Commerce Dept. by a Federal lawsuit, "The most troubling potential transfer to China is Rockwell's proposed joint venture deal with the Shanghai Broadcast Equipment Factory and the Shanghai Avionics Corporation, the latter of which is a key enterprise of the Aviation Industries of China." "Rockwell Collins Navigation and Communications Equipment Company, Ltd.," states the 1997 report. "Will design, develop, and build Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation receivers systems for the Chinese market." "These components have serious dual-use applications, since the acquisition of reliable GPS data can enhance, to varying degrees, the capacity of militaries to field highly accurate cruise and ballistic missiles, such as those used to intimidate Taiwan during March 1996." Clearly, Clinton officials were aware of the military affects of the Rockwell/Shanghai venture. Furthermore, the Clinton administration also knew the geo-political impact of the GPS military sale to the Chinese Air Force. For example, the report noted the diplomatic effects on Taiwan of the GPS sale. "More accurate GPS systems would enhance the PLA's ability to carry out attacks against Taiwan's military and industrial facilities," states the report. "Potentially reducing the ability of the Taiwanese military to defend itself against PRC coercive diplomacy." However, the most chilling conclusion was reserved for the effects on U.S. military forces, especially U.S. Naval Forces. "The use of GPS to enhance the accuracy of long-range Chinese cruise missiles, coupled with long-range sensors, would raise serious concerns for the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, and possibly circumscribe their ability to provide an effective deterrent in a crisis over Taiwan." Furthermore, the Chinese may have obtained the "long-range sensors" from the Clinton administration as well...."

Washington Times 5/18/99 Bill Gertz "...The United States had imposed sanctions against China in 1993 for selling M-11 missile components but lifted them the next year at the urging of Mr. Brown and C. Michael Armstrong, chairman of Los Angeles-based satellite maker Hughes Electronics. Mr. Armstrong had written a terse letter to President Clinton on Oct. 29, 1993, first highlighting how he had done what the president requested by supporting his economic and trade policies and calls for looser export controls. "I am respectfully requesting your involvement to resolve the China sanctions," Mr. Armstrong wrote, noting that he had spoken to a Chinese official who informed him Beijing was "positive" about the idea. But when then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the Chinese that the United States needed to see "some sign of movement" by China on curbing weapons proliferation, a National Security Council memorandum reported, "The Chinese were not forthcoming." The memo said Mr. Armstrong and Hughes Electronics "lobbied aggressively" to be allowed to sell satellites to China. In 1995, the president named Mr. Armstrong to the influential Export Council, where he worked hard against trade controls designed to protect national security. The council produced a lengthy paper arguing against imposing sanctions on foreign trading partners that engaged in illicit weapons sales. Bernard L. Schwartz, chairman of Loral Space & Communications Ltd., also lobbied hard to ease restrictions on satellite sales to China. Mr. Schwartz denied that his large donations to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) were meant to influence Mr. Clinton's policies on satellite exports...."

San Diego Union-Tribune 5/16/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...*The state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful for uranium prospecting made by International Imaging Systems, a California company. China National Nuclear then helped Iran prospect for uranium that American intelligence officials believe will be used in making nuclear weapons...."

San Diego Union-Tribune 5/16/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...*The state-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which manufactures China's newest anti-ship cruise missiles, was allowed to buy a computer system that is useful for simulating wind effects. Not only did these missiles strengthen the Chinese military, but the company has also exported some to Iran, where, according to the United States naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten our personnel...."

San Diego Union-Tribune 5/16/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...*The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to buy equipment from the Convex Computer Corp. (which has since been bought by Hewlett-Packard) for processing data from an experimental fusion reactor. The academy then exported the reactor to Iran, where it is used for training nuclear scientists...."

Washington Post 5/25/99 Juliet Eilperin and Vernon Loeb Page A01 "...As for stolen U.S. military technology, the committee reports that China has stolen guidance technology now being used in U.S. missiles and fighter aircraft, including the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-117 fighter jets. The committee concludes that this guidance technology is of enormous value to China in its development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and short-range CSS-6 missiles, which China test-fired over Taiwan's main ports in 1996. The committee, which began its probe last July by focusing on missile and satellite technology transfers, concludes that U.S. satellite manufacturers gave China missile design information without obtaining required U.S. government licenses that enabled Chinese engineers to improve the reliability of Chinese rockets used for commercial and military purposes. The committee concludes that Hughes Electronics Corp. and Loral Space & Communications passed sensitive technical information to China as part of a 1996 investigation into the failure of a Chinese Long March rocket carrying a Loral-built commercial satellite without an export license, even though both companies knew they needed a license.... Loral's chief executive officer, Bernard Schwartz, was the Democratic Party's largest single donor in 1996. C. Michael Armstrong, Hughes's chief executive from 1994 to 1997, strongly lobbied for the Clinton administration's March 1996 transfer of licensing authority over commercial satellites from the State Department, known for its focus on national security concerns, to the Commerce Department, with its emphasis on promoting U.S. exports. ...."

5/25/99 Bloomberg Press Dina Temple-Raston Tony Capaccio "...A bipartisan U.S. congressional committee that detailed 20 years of spying by China unanimously recommended a series of steps to tighten export controls, prompting some U.S. companies to say they fear a backlash that will hurt trade with China....``Our cities are being held in threat by information that left our country decades ago,'' Cox said at a press conference. ``The PRC has mounted a widespread effort to obtain U.S. military technology both legal and illegal.'' The report says stolen U.S. technology runs from classified information on every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile inventory to guidance systems used on Navy and Army missiles and aircraft, including the F-117 stealth fighter.....The panel approved 38 recommendations to tighten security, including implementing counter-intelligence programs at the National Laboratories, giving scientists at the labs polygraph tests, and resurrecting high-technology export controls similar to those in a 1949 accord, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or Cocom..... The report concluded the U.S. should impose strict, Cold War- style controls on high-technology exports to China and called on the Clinton administration to coordinate with other countries to limit exports of high-performance computer chips, machine tools and other sensitive goods...... Specifically, the Clinton administration said it would support efforts to review technology transfers to China and is already moving to shift the review of high-technology sales from the Commerce Department to a reviewing board at the State Department. U.S. shipments of advanced technology such as satellites and computers to China almost doubled to $6.1 billion in 1998 from $3.1 billion in 1994, according to Commerce Department figures....."

5/25/99 Bloomberg Press Dina Temple-Raston Tony Capaccio "...The Cox report singles out two companies - Hughes Electronics Corp., the nation's No. 1 maker of commercial satellites, and Loral Space & Communications Ltd. -- for directly improving China's Long March rocket program by providing information that helped China get to the bottom of several of its failed rocket launches. The companies' advice not only had commercial applications but also helped the Chinese develop their ballistic missile program, the report said. What's more, Cox said, the two companies didn't get the necessary licenses to share the information with China, even though they knew it was required...."

5/25/99 CBN News "...LEE WEBB: Mr. Gertz, thank you for being with us this morning. BILL GERTZ: Good morning.....WEBB: Bill, if you will, connect the dots for our viewers because of these technology transfers, the spying, the Chinese contributions to the Clinton Administration. Do the dots in fact connect? GERTZ: We are starting to connect the dots, and I think this Cox report will be the first step in that direction. Is there a smoking gun document that somewhere says, 'Campaign contributions from the Chinese government to the Democratic Party in '96 led to the relaxation of export controls? We haven't found that yet. Congress has tried to look into that. Reporters have tried to look into that but it hasn't been found. It clearly looks like that on the surface. In the Cox report, they detail how certain high tech satellite makers in the U.S. pressed hard to get these changes so that they could sell their satellites with what seems to be little or no regard for the national security consequences. And the administration was fueling that lack of concern because they kept downplaying the threat from China as well as other nations...... "

1/22/98 Jay Kraemer ffhsj.com/firmpage/cmemos/012Copyright (c) 1998 Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson "....In a significant change made without preambular explanation (and separate from President Clinton's January 12 certification of China as having provided satisfactory assurances that it is not assisting in nuclear weapons proliferation), the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) has just amended its regulations to eliminate control list-based license requirements from a broad range of nuclear power-related equipment and technology. These changes, nominally a part of BXA's regulatory changes implementing the list of dual use items adopted by the Wassenar Arrangement (the successor to COCOM), will likely have their greatest impact with respect to exports to China, but will also significantly facilitate nuclear trade with other countries as well. BXA's amendments to the Commerce Control List (CCL), published in the Federal Register on January 15, 1998 (63 F.R. 2452, et seq.), are also designed to clarify the line between BXA's export control jurisdiction and that of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE).... "

5/25/99 Bill Gertz Washington Times "...The report states that Hughes' chairman C. Michael Armstrong and Loral's chief Bernard L. Schwartz advocated the transfer of export licensing authority from the stricter controls of the State Department to the Commerce Department. Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Hughes signed a letter to President Clinton urging the relaxation of satellite export controls, which was ultimately adopted by the president. Loral and Hughes won waivers or export licenses for their satellites to be launched in China on five projects between 1993 and 1999...."

New York Times 1/28/97 Editorial "The Clinton Administration's tendency to let commercial opportunities override sensible national security policies is troubling. Recent days brought word that last summer business considerations led the White House to waive a law prohibiting American companies from doing business with countries that sponsor terrorism. Specifically, officials gave approval to the Occidental Petroleum Corporation to take part in a $930 million oil project in Sudan. The Administration has also dropped a longstanding ban on sales of the Amraam air-to-air missile to countries outside NATO. The decision cripples efforts to negotiate limits on arms sales and increases the risk that this highly effective weapon may one day be used against America or its allies. The ban was dropped to allow American aerospace companies to gain a competitive edge over Russian and French rivals. The most effective way to fight terrorism or restrain arms sales is through international action. But with the world's biggest economy and its most technologically advanced arms industry, America can exert considerable influence on its own, provided it maintains strict and consistent standards. When Washington starts selectively enforcing its own rules, its policies become meaningless.."

WorldNetDaily 6/1/99 Charles Smith The JL-2 explains why the Chinese were so interested in American space contractor, Hughes, upgrading PLA rockets with "nose-cone" or "shroud" technology. The Cox report details Chinese Lt. Gen. Shen Rougjun and his penetration of Hughes through his son, Shen Jun. In May 1994, Shen, was second in command at COSTIND -- the Chinese Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. Shen served underneath the PLA spy-master, Gen. Ding Henggao. In 1994, COSTIND Gen. Shen attended several business meetings with Hughes. During a 1994 visit, Shen's son, Shen Jun, attended a business lunch with his father and Frank Taormina of Hughes. Taormina later assisted Shen Jun in obtaining a job at Hughes. The Cox report details "son" Shen played a significant role in the interaction between his PLA general-father and the highest of Hughes executives, including CEO Michael Armstrong. In 1994, Hughes executives were scrambling to avoid a major expense. Hughes helped PLA engineers after the failure of a PLA Long March rocket carrying a Hughes-built satellite. Hughes, anxious not to see a hike in their satellite insurance rates, eagerly pinned the failure on the PLA nose-cone "shroud" design and not on their satellite. The help included Hughes proprietary software for nose-cone design and analysis derived from years of ballistic missile tests in America. Although, Shen Jun was hired at Hughes in August of 1994, according to the Cox report, "a division of Space Systems/Loral was also considering hiring Shen for a position that would have allowed him access to classified information." In August 1994, Lt. Gen. Shen also met and consummated a series of satellite deals with Bernard Schwartz, the CEO of Loral. The Beijing meeting was arranged by President Clinton and included Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. The technology obtained from Loral is also detailed by the Cox report, including rocket guidance and encrypted satellite telemetry systems...."

Jewish World Review 6/1/99 Mona Charen "...It was Clinton's decision, overruling the recommendation of then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher, to permit American companies to help China modernize its missiles. Very soon thereafter, The Washington Times reported that China was assisting Iran and Libya to develop missile programs. The Clinton administration continues to claim that China is abiding by its non-proliferation agreement...."

Jewish World Review 6/1/99 Mona Charen "...It was also Clinton's decision to transfer authority over technology transfers from the somewhat vigilant Department of State to the anything-goes Department of Commerce. Bernard Schwartz, chairman of Loral Corporation, donated $100,000 to the DNC and was then provided with a technology-transfer waiver, according to the Cox report. The Loral technology has helped China dramatically improve the accuracy of its missiles. And as the Cox report documents, the Chinese government has been able to steal pretty much all of our nuclear secrets, thanks to docility of the Clinton administration...."

Rep Curt Weldon Web Page 9/15/93 Bill Clinton "...Dear Edward:....I wanted to bring you up to date on a topic we were not able to discuss at lunch: the issue of export controls. As you know, for sone time the United States has inposed stringent exports controls on many of our most competitive exports...I wanted you to know that we hope to announce some important reforms by September 30. As you may know, Commerce secretary Ron Brown has been leading a process within the Trade Promotion Coordination Commettee (TPCC) to examine how we might better promote U.S. exports. As part of that process, the National Security Council has led as effort to develop specific export control reforms.... Let me give you a sense of the reforms we are considering: Liberalize Computer and Telecommunications Controls... Reduce Processing Times...Expand Distribution Licenses.... Elimimate Unnecessary Unilateral Controls....I expect that these reforms will help liberalize controls on tens of billions of dollars worth of U.S. exports. It can help unleash our companies to compete successfully in the global market.These reforms fit into a broader framwork. Soon we will complete our review of nonproliferation and export control policy, which will set guidlines for further steps we should take. I am also currently engaged in seeking major reforms to COCOM, which should lead to significant liberalization of controls on computers, telecommunications, and machine tools, while establishing a more effective structure for addressing the changing natiional security threats we will face in the years ahead. Let me assure you that I am personally committed to developing a more intelligent export control policy, one that prevents dangerous technologies from falling into the wrong hands without unfairly burdening American commerce.....Sincerely, Signature - Bill Clinton Mr. Edward McCracken Chief Executive Officer Silicon Graphics..."

New York Times 6/4/99 Jeff Gerth "...In a diplomatically sensitive case, the Justice Department is nearing a decision on whether to indict one of China's most powerful state-owned corporations, law-enforcement officials and lawyers say. Some career prosecutors in the department have recommended the indictment of the corporation, Catic, an aerospace giant, on charges of buying American machining equipment for civilian use in 1994 and diverting some of it to a military plant, the officials and lawyers said. The equipment was sold to the Chinese by McDonnell Douglas, now part of The Boeing Company, which has also been under criminal investigation for possible violations of American export laws..... Catic agreed with the Justice Department last month to extend the deadline for filing charges, the officials and lawyers said. It was five years ago that McDonnell Douglas applied for a Commerce Department license to sell the machining equipment to Catic, which buys and sells civilian aerospace technology. Since the extension, the parties have been in a "continuing dialogue," and Catic has discussed the possibility of paying a civil penalty to resolve the case, one lawyer said. ....The sale of machining equipment was part of a billion-dollar jetliner deal in 1994 in which McDonnell Douglas was to build aircraft in China. At the time, the aircraft deal was promoted by President Clinton and Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown as a centerpiece of the Administration's commercial diplomacy, the policy of using economic engagement to broaden ties with Beijing and promote exports. But within a few months of the announcement of the deal, McDonnell Douglas discovered that some of the equipment it sold to China had been sent 800 miles from Beijing to a military facility in Nanchang that makes missiles and fighter aircraft. And though the 1994 deal announced by President Clinton called for the building of 20 planes, a Boeing spokesman said today that China would build only 1 or 2 planes with the company..... The committee's unanimous report also found that Catic had played a central role in China's drive to acquire technology with civilian and military uses and that on several occasions Catic had "misrepresented the proposed uses of military useful U.S. technology." The Clinton Administration prevented the committee from disclosing further details. In addition, Justice Department officials blocked the committee from disclosing 1994 cables that showed how Administration officials delayed seeking timely assurances from Catic on how it planned to use the machining equipment so as not to disrupt Brown's announcement in China of the McDonnell Douglas aircraft deal, officials familiar with the report said. The Commerce Department received an assurance from Catic after Brown left China but it left unanswered the question of exactly where the machining equipment would be located, according to excerpts from a Sept. 13, 1994, cable included in the Cox committee report. On Sept. 14 the department approved the export of the machining equipment -- some of it more than a decade old, including machine tools to shape and bend large aircraft parts -- for use in Beijing as part of the McDonnell Douglas project to build aircraft in China. The license included some last-minute additions to allay concerns raised by the Pentagon. In August, the Defense Intelligence Agency warned that the Chinese did not really need the equipment for the civilian aircraft deal but that "an advanced machine tool facility presents a unique opportunity for Chinese military aerospace facilities to access advanced equipment which otherwise might be denied," the Cox report said...."

Fox News Channel 6/6/99 Carl Cameron Freeper Watchdog "...Less than two weeks after the Congressional Cox report criticized the Clinton Admin for approving exports of High Performance Computer to China, the Commerce Dept. wants to ease export controls to another 100 plus countries. The new countries that would be granted access are worldwide; Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other nations in Asia, South America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Africa. Some restrictions will remain on exports to about 50 countries including China which the Cox Report says has illegally diverted US super computers to military complexes for development of nuclear, space based, and conventional weapons Source say the White House is divided over how much can be loosened. Super Computing is measured in millions of technical operations per second (MTOPS) Currently the ceiling is 10,000 MTOPS, manufacturers want the limit raised to 30,000. The Clinton Admin has loosened Super Computer export rules twice before. Any significant decontrol would be considered highly provocative in the wake of the COX report. Source say WH COS John Podesta is supposed to discuss the move with a group of industry leaders Friday from IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Intel and Sun-microsytems ...."

Wall Street Journal 6/8/99 Rep Cox and Rep Dicks "...As Americans weigh the findings of the report and debate its implications, one question we frequently encounter is: Now that the PRC has stolen our nuclear secrets, what can we do about it? This week, we will offer several of our committee's 38 recommendations as a floor amendment to the defense authorization bill. These include giving the Defense Department control of security at Chinese launches of U.S. rockets, and centralizing responsibility for nuclear weapons counterintelligence at the Department of Energy. In addition, we have urged the Clinton administration to move forward aggressively with our recommendations in the critical matter of export controls....If U.S. firms are the only ones prevented from making sales of militarily useful technologies, America will be twice the loser. First, we will lose out on profitable deals, to the detriment of both individual workers and our overall economy. Second, China will remain free to acquire militarily useful technology from third countries, to the detriment of our national security. That is why our select committee unanimously recommended reviving an effective international export control regime on the model of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls. Cocom forbade member governments to sell their most sensitive militarily useful technologies to Warsaw Pact countries and the People's Republic of China. But in 1994, amid the euphoria that followed the end of the Cold War, Cocom was allowed to expire. For two years we had no replacement for Cocom at all. Then, in 1996, the U.S. and other countries, recognizing the mistake they had made, entered into the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls. But Wassenaar is a remarkably weak accord. It furnishes a list of controlled items but allows each country to make sales of these items at their own discretion. In practice, this means that any country can do whatever it wants. The U.S. must now exercise its leadership to establish binding multilateral controls on technology transfers that threaten international peace and U.S. national security. A new regime of multilateral controls will enhance America's global competitiveness, since we won't have to go it alone when it comes to export policy. This is also consistent with our goal of promoting trade with China, which for too long has been too much a one-way street. And the timing is propitious. This is the year for an already scheduled international review of the efficacy of the Wassenaar Arrangement....."

Drudge 6/7/99 "...The White House is preparing to loosen government controls on the sale of powerful super computers to more than 100 countries only two weeks after a congressional committee charged it with carelessly permitting sales to China, the LOS ANGELES TIMES is planning to report in Tuesday editions. ...The Commerce Department has proposed easing restrictions on sales of supercomputers to "most countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, administration sources said Monday." Gosselin reports that "virtually all restrictions are likely to be lifted on sales to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which recently became NATO members." The White House's John Podesta, last seen drafting a new Medicare proposal that extends drug coverage to all beneficiaries, has taken charge of announcing the new supercomputer policy. According to Gosselin, first official word that the White House is prepared to ease export limits on the 100 countries could come during a meeting scheduled for Friday between Podesta and a group that includes "IBM Chairman and Chief Executive Louis Gerstner, Intel Corp. Chairman Andy Grove, Sun Microsystems Inc. CEO Scott D. McNealy and Hewlett-Packard Co. Chairman and President Lewis E.Platt." ..."

Curt Weldon Website 6/8/99 "...the bottom line question has to be asked, Mr. Speaker, is: What made this happen? What was the grease that caused these transactions to take place? What caused these proliferation controls to be lowered? What caused these accesses to take place? And that gets to my second chart, Mr. Speaker, which is the time line.....Up until 1993, Mr. Speaker, under Democrats and Republican Presidents alike, there was a process in place to control technology from Nations like America to be sent abroad to what we consider to be Tier 3 nations or nations that are not allowed or were not supposed to have very capable technology that could come back to hurt us. This process was called COCOM. COCOM was an international organization of allied nations, the U.S. and Japan, that met on a regular basis, and they decided collectively what kind of technology would be allowed to be sold and to which countries it could be sold to. In 1993, without pre-approval of any of the other countries, France, Great Britain, Japan or any of the other ones, this administration ended COCOM, ended it, and the doors opened up. Now they put into place something called the Wassanar agreement which everyone has acknowledged is a total failure, yet COCOM worked. In 1993 COCOM ended, and the floodgates opened...."

Curt Weldon Website 6/8/99 "...from the White House dated September 15, 1993, to Edward McCracken, Chief Executive Officer of Silicon Graphics from Bill Clinton. Mr. Speaker, every American needs to read this letter because this letter was sent by the President of the United States September 15, 1993, and who did he send it to? To one of his biggest contributors and one of those blocks of people who supported his candidacy, Edward McCracken, Chief Executive Officer, Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, California....So here it is in black and white where the President is telling the CEO of Silicon Graphics this is what we are going to do for you over the next 6 years. Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They did it. What were some of the highlights? Let me read from the letter. Quote: Liberalize computer and telecommunication controls, reduce processing times, expand distribution licenses, eliminate unnecessary unilateral controls, and it goes into detail in describing. Now, Mr. Speaker, I am a free trader, and I believe in allowing our companies to compete. But what you had in 1993 was the wholesale opening of the flood gates...."

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY 6/9/99 Paul Sperry "...In fact, previous administrations beefed up counterspying efforts. ''This doesn't say there wasn't spying on my watch, but we spent $1.5 billion covering counterintelligence operations when the Reagan administration came in and acknowledged security problems at the labs,'' said Frank Gaffney, Reagan's assistant secretary of Defense for international security policy. Export Controls Clinton argues, reasonably, that past administrations opened the door to satellite exports to China. But he also claims he was just following suit. Here, he's at odd with the facts. Though Reagan and Bush allowed exports of commercial satellites to China, they still worried about the Chinese military getting its hands on dual-use technology. So they maintained export licensing safeguards. The same can't be said for Clinton. If satellite technology were a present, the degree of gift-giving among the three presidents can be compared like this: Reagan provided the box. Bush provided the paper. Clinton put the technology in the box, wrapped it up, tied a bow and shipped it FedEx to Beijing...."

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY 6/9/99 Paul Sperry "...After the Challenger blew up that year, the U.S. government and industry found they could no longer rely on the space shuttle to launch their satellites. So Reagan turned to, among other countries, China. It not only had a lot of capacity but, thanks to state subsidies, cheap launch rates. For the first time, Reagan granted export licenses for satellite launches on Chinese rockets -provided the Defense Department monitored talks between U.S. and Chinese engineers. In fact, both the State Department and Defense still had the authority to reject export license applications on national security grounds. In 1991, Bush tightened controls, citing China's proliferation of missile technology. He imposed sanctions on Chinese entities, including satellite launchers. The CIA has described China's satellite launch rockets as ''ballistic missiles in disguise.'' After pressure from China and U.S. satellite makers, Bush softened his stance. In 1992, he put the Commerce Department in charge of vetting export applications for satellites - but only commercial ones. That is, only those with no military use. But in November 1996, Clinton took it one big step further. He not only removed Bush's sanctions on Chinese launchers, but put Commerce in charge of vetting applications for all fully assembled satellite exports to China - no matter their potential military use. Unlike State, Commerce no longer required Defense to monitor technical talks between Chinese and U.S. engineers. In many cases, such talks went beyond ''form, fit and function'' -basic information needed to mate satellites to rocket platforms...."

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY 6/9/99 Paul Sperry "...What's more, Commerce - primarily a trade booster - eschewed State's munitions list to screen for military use. So basically Clinton took satellites off one list and put them on another to make them easier to export. Clinton has OK'd 19 U.S.-China satellite launches - the most of the three presidents. Of those, 16 have been launched. According to a senior Pentagon official, Clinton has also taken the teeth out of the Pentagon's arms-control oversight role. In the previous two administrations, if there was a dispute between the White House and the Pentagon over technology transfers, the Pentagon usually won when China was involved. Not so under Clinton. ''We've had no successes,'' the Pentagon official said...."

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY 6/9/99 Paul Sperry "...James Woolsey, Clinton's first CIA director, said in a recent interview: ''The United States has substantially liberalized its export policy. That's one thing that has changed during this administration.'' Woolsey added: ''We've gone too far.'' In a 1993 letter to Silicon Graphics CEO Edward McCracken, Clinton wrote: ''I expect to . . . eliminate wherever possible unnecessary U.S. unilateral export control policies.'' Silicon Graphics makes high-speed computers. True to his word, Clinton in January 1996 lifted export controls on high-speed computer exports. Since then, China's gotten more than 600 U.S. high- speed computers. It had virtually none before...."

Los Angeles Times 6/8/99 Peter Gosselin "...The Clinton administration is preparing to loosen government controls on the sale of powerful computers to more than 100 countries only two weeks after a congressional committee charged it with carelessly permitting sales to China. The Commerce Department has proposed easing restrictions on sales to most countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, administration sources said Monday. In addition, virtually all restrictions are likely to be lifted on sales to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which recently became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In a move that seems certain to anger U.S. computer makers, however, the administration will not ease restrictions on China and almost 50 other countries. The split decision is a graphic illustration of the powerfully conflicting impulses that now grip Washington over the export of American technological know-how...."

Washington Times 6/11/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "....With the help of U.S. technologies approved for export since 1993 by the Clinton administration, China has been able to improve its existing fleet of ICBMs and move forward deployment of its next generation DF-31 and DF-41 by at least five years, putting at risk American cities and America's children. This is because China learned the secrets of reliable solid fuel rockets from American companies, and was able to design them using U.S.-built supercomputers, licensed for sale by the Clinton administration. The report demonstrates that U.S. technology approved for export to China by the Clinton administration has helped the Chinese military build a new encrypted communications network, improving its command and control. And by welcoming large Chinese military delegations to our military exercises in the Pacific, the U.S. has shown the Chinese how to exploit this technology to their advantage on the battlefield..."

6/12/99 SCMP Chris Yeung "...Any attempt by the US Congress to ban technology exports to the SAR would be opposed, the Government vowed yesterday. The pledge followed the "unfounded" attack on Hong Kong's trade control regime in the Cox report. In a full response to the report, which accused Beijing of stealing US nuclear secrets and alleged that key commodities were being smuggled into the mainland via Hong Kong, senior trade officials stressed the control regime was well-established and there was no need for any adjustments. Acting Secretary for Trade and Industry Yvonne Choi Ying-pik said: "The SAR Government considers the allegations regarding the use of Hong Kong as a point of diversion as unfounded and groundless. Our control over strategic trade is quite adequate. And we will further co-ordinate with the US side to do better." ...."

6/12/99 AFP "...Responding to allegations of Chinese spying, the chairman of the US Senate banking committee has vowed to act quickly to re-authorise a lapsed law that would tighten curbs on hi-tech exports to China. "The one thing Congress can do as part of dealing with the problem is to re-authorise the Export Administration Act, strengthening its provisions, streamlining its process," Senator Phil Gramm told a committee hearing on Thursday. "We are going to proceed on a very tight time schedule" in considering and amending the law, said Senator Gramm, a Republican whose committee has jurisdiction in the Senate over US export controls. He plans a series of public hearings, followed by a "mark-up" session on June 29 at which committee members may make changes in draft legislation. In this instance, legislators are particularly concerned with controlling dual-use technologies such as computers with both civilian and military applications. The Export Administration Act of 1979 lapsed in September 1990 because then Republican president George Bush and Congress failed to agree on an export control policy. Mr Bush and his successor, President Bill Clinton, have since extended the law for short periods, but its tough criminal penalties have lapsed...."

Koenig's International News 6/10/99 Charles Smith "...According to Defense Secretary Perry, the U.S. contact for PLA General Ding was Barry Carter, Commerce Deputy Undersecretary of Export Administration. According to Federal Election Commission records, Barry Carter is a DNC donor and currently a Professor of Law at Georgetown University. In 1994, Carter worked at the Commerce Dept. under Ron Brown. Barry Carter exchanged correspondence with several major China-Gate players including PLA Lt. General Huai Guomo, PLA Major General Deng Yousheng, Ken Kay, a lobbyist for Sun Computers, and Eden Woon of the Washington State China Relations Council. The 1995 PLA list given to Carter is part of a series of letters between the Commerce Dept., various Chinese Army officers and anxious U.S. vendors. The 1995 list provided to Carter included "China YuanWang (Group)" and several other well know Chinese Army owned companies such as "NORINCO", "China National Nuclear", "China State Shipbuilding" and "China Aerospace." Carter also included his own personal touch to the list, by providing the phone, fax and address for his PLA contact in Beijing, "Lieutenant Colonel Wang Zhongchao", and his contact at the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., "Colonel Xu Cunyong." Carter provided the list of PLA companies and contacts to Eden Woon, donor to U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Executive Director of the Washington State China Relations Council (WSCRC) and Director of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce..... In December 1995, Eden Woon and the WSCRC hosted a delegation of Chinese Army representatives from PLA owned companies. Woon took them on a tour of the Washington state companies anxious to do business with the Chinese Army. The 1995 delegation to Washington state included "Feng Hui, Staff officer" of the COSTIND "Foreign Affairs Dep't." Feng Hui is better known as Major Feng Hui of the Chinese Army. Major Feng was accompanied by other officers from the PLA unit COSTIND, and a host of engineering specialists from various PLA owned companies, including "Chengdu Aircraft plant", the "Jiangnan Shipyard" and "No. 614 Institute", a PLA institute staffed by weapons experts. There is a clear reason why Major Feng trusted Eden Woon to help the Chinese Army do business in Seattle and beyond. Woon's radical views of U.S./Sino relations do not include a free Taiwan. In 1997, Woon and the Washington State China Relations Council sponsored a conference that included U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA). On October 14, 1997, at the close of the conference, the participants issued a report that states, "The U.S. should ensure that Taiwan understands that if conflicts arise (especially if apparently provoked by Taiwan), it cannot necessarily count on the U.S. coming to the rescue." ..."

Koenig's International News 6/10/99 Charles Smith "...In 1994, Carter corresponded with "Ken" Kay who was then "Director" of the Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP), a consortium of powerful U.S. computer makers. According to the CSPP, in March 1994, the CSPP Director "Kenneth R. Kay," was also "a partner in the law firm of Preston Gates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds."..... In 1994, CSPP Director Ken Kay contacted Barry Carter and Ron Brown in an extensive effort to expand computer exports to China and Russia. Kay pressured Ron Brown by issuing an internal report to ease "export control policy" and seek "new thresholds for computers"......By April 1994, Ken Kay left the employ of Preston Gates and took a new position at Podesta Associates, the powerful lobby firm owned by Tony Podesta, brother of White House advisor John Podesta. Kay, of course, took his CSPP clients with him by retaining his executive directorship of the consortium. The shift to Podesta Associates was quickly felt by the CSPP members and the PLA. In August, 1994, CSPP members IBM, Cray and Tandem were invited to participate on a Brown trade trip to China. While on the trip, CSPP member Tandem sold over $100 million in computers to PLA owned Great Wall Industries, manufacturer of the Chinese Army nuclear tipped missiles...."

Koenig's International News 6/10/99 Charles Smith "...According to a May 1995 CSPP document sent to Ron Brown, "controls on computer exports to Russia and China for commercial, civil end-users should be eliminated; controls on exports for actual military end-uses may be appropriate until there is greater certainty that neither country poses a threat to U.S. national security." The Clinton administration saw no "threat" to U.S. national security in the U.S. "strategic partner" Communist China. In response, CSPP members IBM, and Tandem were given the list of approved PLA owned companies wanting their business by Barry Carter. In 1995, both companies elected to join the "Chinese Defense Conversion" project. The list of IBM and Tandem contacts were given to the Chinese Army in an exclusive report on U.S. companies provided by Barry Carter directly to PLA General Huai Guomo of COSTIND. By November, 1995, the CSPP sent a letter to Ron Brown thanking him for the change in export policy. The CSPP letter states "we want to express our great appreciation for your role in the President's recent decision to significantly reform computer export controls." ..."

Investor's Business Daily 6/15/99 Editorial "...The Clinton administration has proposed easing controls on the export of high-speed computers to more than 100 countries. The White House also says limits on technology sales to China won't be relaxed. How effective will this be? It sounds like the administration is playing it safe in light of the Cox report's charges that the White House didn't do enough to stop the export of powerful computers into China. It's a ruse. Clinton can pretend to be tough on China, but this hard-line position is as porous as a sieve. Many of the countries on the just-approved list are trading partners with China. So if China wants the computers -and it does - it only has to buy them from these countries. In fact, China has already used other countries as brokers, the Cox report says. The practice will surely grow if Clinton's proposed export rules are adopted. High-tech hardware will run unchecked into China through the back door - which Clinton will hold open. Controlling computer exports is a tricky issue. Free trade - one of the hallmarks of a free people - must be balanced by security concerns..... The White House can undo some of the damage by creating a group like the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. COCOM was an international concern formed in 1949 to control technology exports for security purposes. It was dissolved in 1994 through an effort led by Clinton. Two years later the White House lifted export controls. China then went from having almost no U.S. high-speed computers to more than 600. It also benefited from the export of U.S. satellite technology that has the potential to make Chinese missiles more accurate. Yet this White House still won't acknowledge that it's neglected - and fueled - a security threat. Now it wants to be a door stop for Chinese exports. Congress should slam the door shut...."

5/28/93 Office of the Press Secretary Statement by the President "...Yesterday the American people won a tremendous victory as a majority of the House of Representatives joined me in adopting our plan to revitalize America's economic future. Today, members of Congress have joined me to announce a new chapter in United States policy toward China. China occupies an important place in our nation's foreign policy. It is the world's most populous state, its fastest growing major economy, and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Its future will do much to shape the future of Asia, our security and trade relations in the Pacific, and a host of global issues, from the environment to weapons proliferation. In short: our relationship with China is of very great importance.... To implement this policy, I am signing today an Executive Order that will have the effect of extending Most Favored Nation status for China for 12 months. Whether I extend MFN next year, however, will depend upon whether China makes significant progress in improving its human rights record.....The Administration is now examining reports that China has shipped M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. If true, such action would violate China's commitment to observe the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Existing U.S. law provides for strict sanctions against nations that violate these guidelines. We have made our concerns on the M-11 issue known to the Chinese on numerous occasions. They understand the serious consequences of missile transfers under U.S. sanctions law. If we determine that China has, in fact, transferred M-11 missiles or related equipment in violation of its commitments, my Administration will not hesitate to act....."

11/14/1994 Office of the Press Secretary "...Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and section 201 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), I hereby report to the Congress that I have exercised my statutory authority to declare a national emergency and to issue an Executive order that consolidates the functions of two existing Executive orders, eliminates provisions that have been superseded by legislation, and expands certain existing authorizations in order to enhance our ability to respond to the threat of weapons of mass destruction-related proliferation activities around the world.... My Administration continues to believe that the harmonized proliferation sanctions legislation it included as part of the proposed new Export Administration Act represents the best means of maximizing the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of U.S. nonproliferation policy while minimizing adverse economic impacts on U.S. exporters. Until such harmonized sanctions legislation is enacted, however, I believe that it is appropriate as an interim measure to take the steps described above to consolidate and streamline the restrictions of the former nonproliferation Executive orders...."

3/21/95 Office of Press Secretary "....Additionally, section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (NEA) (50U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) requires that the President, within 90 days after the end of each 6-month period following a declaration of a national emergency, report to the Congress on the total expenditures directly attributable to that declaration. This report, covering the 6-monthperiod from August 19, 1994, to February 19, 1995, is submitted in compliance with these requirements. 3. Since the issuance of Executive Order No. 12924, the Department of Commerce has continued to administer and enforce the system of export controls, including anti boycott provisions, contained in the Export Administration Regulations. In administering these controls, the Department has acted under a policy of conforming actions under Executive Order No. 12924 to those required under the Export Administration Act, insofar as appropriate...... Effective September 30, 1994, the Department of Commerce revised thecontrol language for MTCR items on the Commerce Control List, based on the results of the last MTCR plenary. The revisions reflect advances in technology and clarifications agreed to multilaterally. On October 4, 1994, negotiations to resolve the 1993 sanctions imposed on China for MTCR violations involving missile-related trade with Pakistan were successfully concluded. The United States lifted the Category II sanctions effective November 1, in exchange for a Chinese commitment not to export ground-to-ground Category I missiles to any destination..... In February 1994, the Department of Commerce issued a Federal Register notice that invited public comment on ways to improve the Export Administration Regulations. The project's objective is "to make the rules and procedures for the control of exports simpler and easier to understand and apply." This project is not intended to be a vehicle to implement substantive change in the policies or procedures of export administration, but rather to make those policies and procedures simpler and clearer to the exporting community. Reformulating and simplifying the Export Administration Regulations is an important priority, and significant progress has been made over the last 6 months in working toward completion of this comprehensive undertaking...... 5. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 6-monthperiod from August 19, 1994, to February 19, 1995, that are directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with respect to export controls were largely centered in the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration. Expenditures by the Department of Commerce are anticipated to be $19,681,000 most of which represents program operating costs, wage and salary costs for Federal personnel and overhead expenses...."

Washington Times 3/9/97 William Triplett "....* Technology transfers to the PLA: President Bush used his powers to forbid a Chinese takeover of an American aerospace firm in Seattle. High technology exports to China were strictly controlled by an international arrangement of the Western powers called "COCOM ' " Although the British and French privately complained to Capitol Hill about this, the Clinton administration scrapped COCOM as a first order of business. Not only has the Clinton administration drastically raised the levels of militarily critical goods and technology that can be exported to China, Kenneth Tiananmen reveals in this month's American Spectator that a secret committee headed by Ira Magaziner hopes to lift the export ban American nuclear technology to China...."

Washington Times 3/9/97 William Triplett "....* Enhancing the PLA's military build-up: After Tiananmen President Bush canceled all sales to the PLA. Under President Clinton, there has been a very quiet effort to enhance positively the PLA's military build-up in other ways. ...."

U.S. Newswire 6/22/99 "...The U.S. Senate moved today to stem illicit transfers of sensitive technology to China through front companies in Hong Kong and Macao, adopting legislation by U.S. Sen. John Ashcroft (R-Mo.). The Ashcroft-sponsored export controls were recommended by the General Accounting Office after an investigation of potential technology losses to China through exports to Hong Kong. If China diverts sensitive U.S. technology, the provision would impose new controls on exports of dual-use and militarily significant equipment. Detonation devices, agents for chemical weapons, and equipment that could be used for nuclear weapons development are examples of items that would be covered under the Ashcroft provision. Military explosives and propellants are examples of Munitions List items. Machine tools that can be used for civilian or military purposes are examples of "dual use" technology. Ashcroft said: "As recent reports document staggering U.S. intelligence losses to China, it is past time to ensure safeguards are in place to protect sensitive U.S. exports to Hong Kong. Investigators have identified Chinese front companies in Hong Kong with illicit efforts to buy sensitive technology and re-export it to countries that proliferate weapons of mass destruction. Prudence demands that if China diverts sensitive U.S. technology, we impose on Hong Kong and Macao the same export controls that govern sales to China itself." Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of China in 1997; Macao is to revert to China at the end of 1999. Hong Kong is treated as a separate customs territory by the U.S., and less stringent export controls on sensitive technology to Hong Kong could directly benefit China's People's Liberation Army...."

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE, SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE 6/24/99 Dr Stephen D Bryen "...The critical question to be asked and answered is the following: will the proposed legislation advance the objective of having a credible and workable export control program that can protect national security? A first glance suggests that many changes will be needed to accomplish the goal...... My assessment is that the export control program is in chaos and that vital technology is being exported to rival countries, particularly China. This is leading to significant erosion of the balance of power in the Pacific, which I expect to get worse in the next few years as China converts acquired technology into weapons. There is a growing danger of a nuclear missile threat to the United States, in part caused by licensed technology transfers and also the result of espionage. The U.S. Export Control program has been severely weakened by: --the elimination of COCOM without a clearly thought-out alternative to it, and the lack of a multilateral strategy that could protect key United States and allied interests; --a disregard for national security resulting in the export of critical technologies such as supercomputers (over 600 have been delivered to China compared to less than 50 high performance computers available to the Defense Department and military services), satellite and launch technology, hot section jet engine technology, global positioning system manufacturing technology, advanced machine tools, high speed fiber optic communications and control systems, cryptographic equipment and know-how; high temperature "skull" furnaces important to manufacturing nuclear warheads; --the purging of the export control lists without considering fully the national security impact of decontrolling technology; --a pro-export promotion tilt and policy that has undermined the use of export controls as an instrument of national policy; --the alleged intimidation of national security experts in the Defense Department, CIA, Energy Department and elsewhere in the government in order to